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The paper shows that a variety of different scenarios in environmental economics can be
modeled by one abstract concept, an extended cost function, which takes into account a
firm’s technological and regulatory constraints. It satisfies the usual properties of a cost
function and reasonable properties with respect to the regulatory parameter. An extended cost
function represents a simple unified approach which does not depend on the specific form of
regulation and the way emissions are modeled.
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1.  Introduction 
This paper deals with a concept useful for environmental economics. Assuming that firms 
generate a negative externality and are therefore regulated, we describe a representative 
firm’s behavior by means of an extended cost function. A firm’s technological constraints can 
be represented by a production function and – equivalently – by a corresponding (standard) 
cost function (given the usual properties of the technology). When emissions are regulated a 
firm has to obey a regulatory constraint in addition. An extended cost function takes into 
account both kinds of constraints in a simple manner.  
Furthermore, the present note shows that a variety of different scenarios can be represented 
by this concept. We consider a model in which the negative externality is interpreted as 
emissions which are modeled either as an input or as an output. Moreover three instruments 
are examined: an emission tax and absolute and relative standards; i.e. the concept can be 
applied to market based instruments and to performance standards. We will demonstrate that 
in all these cases we obtain the same abstract extended cost function which satisfies the usual 
properties of a cost function and possesses reasonable properties with respect to a parameter 
describing the (level of) regulation. Thus we present a unified approach which is independent 
of the specific form of regulation and of modeling the emissions. 
In order to keep the model as simple as possible only one factor of production is considered 
and the technological constraints are described by the (standard) cost function. Then the 
extended cost function is derived by means of an additional minimization process. The focus 
of the analysis is theoretical, i.e. the implications of using an extended cost function for 
empirical work are not discussed, but the underlying idea and its advantages for comparative 
statics are brought out.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the model and the technological 
constraints and introduces the standard cost function(s). Section 3 is concerned with environ-
mental regulation and defines the extended cost function. In section 4 its properties are 
examined and a simple comparative statics analysis is performed which shows the advantages 
of employing the concept. Section 5 offers some conclusions. 
2.  General framework: standard cost function 
At first we consider the technological constraint(s) and describe the technology of a (repre-
sentative) firm. The model chosen is simple. We assume that the firm employs a factor of 
production Z (like labor or capital or another resource), produces a commodity X (a final 
product), and generates E units of emissions (leading to pollution). In principle the firm is 
able to abate emissions. Its possibilities depend on the way emissions are modeled. One can 
find two different approaches in the literature (cf. e.g. Baumol and Oates (1988), p. 166 and 
p. 36): Emissions can be modeled as an input or as an output. If they are interpreted as a by-
product of production, we have to model it as a joint product. On the other hand we can 
suppose that the production activity uses the environment as a medium for disposal (of 
residuals). Then the actual factor is the service provided by the environment and emissions 
can be modeled as an input. In the first case we assume that emissions can be abated by 
means of a separate abatement technology; in the other one the firm can substitute emissions 
by the factor of production. In the following both approaches are examined.  
(i)  If emissions are modeled as an input, production is characterized by a production function 
() , F EZ which is strictly concave (we assume that the production and cost functions con-
sidered are twice continuously differentiable). E and Z are supposed to be normal factors, i.e. 
the derived demand for E and Z increases with X (see Bear (1965)). Moreover, we assume   2
that the production function F exhibits decreasing returns to scale and that for every Z there is 
() E Z  such that  () () ,0 E FE ZZ = .  ( ) E Z  denotes the level of emissions chosen by the firm 
in the absence of any regulation given Z. 
We will distinguish between the (usual) cost function
1  ( ) ,, CvwX and the conditional cost 
function  () ,, CC w E X  where v and w denote the price of E and Z, respectively. They are 
defined by 
  () ( )
, ,, m i n  s . t .   ,
EZ CvwX v E w Z X FEZ =+ = 
and 
  () ( ) ,, m i n  s . t .   ,
Z CC w E X wZ X F E Z == , 
respectively. The latter describes the minimal costs if the level of emissions is a priori set
2 to 
E. It can also be expressed explicitly by  ( ) ( )
1 ,, , CC w E X wF E X
− =  where 
1 F
−  is the 
inverse of F with respect to the second argument.  
Duality theory implies that the cost functions C and CC satisfy  
Property C  
The cost function is linearly homogeneous, increasing and concave in (factor) prices and 
increasing and convex in output. 
By Shephard’s Lemma the derived demand for E and Z can be described by  v C  and  w C  
( w CC ), respectively, where  , vw CC etc. denote partial derivatives. Furthermore, we obtain 
0 vw C >  and  0 wE CC ≤  since E and Z are substitutes. Normality of E and Z yields 
0, 0 vX wX CC >>  and  0, 0 wX EX CC CC >< . 
(ii)  If emissions are modeled as an output, E and X are joint products. As it is often done in 
environmental economics we identify both variables and define gross emissions by  : g EX = . 
They can be reduced by abatement (think of an end of pipe technology). Supposing that Q 
units of (gross) emission are abated, net emissions are given by  g EE QXQ = −=−. We 
assume that production and abatement also require the factor Z. The corresponding technolo-
gies are described by the cost function  ( ) , CG w X  and, respectively,  () , AC w Q  which satisfy 
Property C. 
The technologies determine the firm’s behavior when it faces further constraints. 
3.  Environmental regulation: extended cost function 
Now we turn to the topic of regulation and consider three instruments of environmental 
policy: an emission tax, and an absolute and a relative emission standard. In each case we 
will describe the regulatory constraint and then derive the corresponding extended cost 
function, i.e. the function of total costs TC which takes into account the costs of production 
and the costs of reacting to the form and level of regulation imposed. The cost function 
depends on output X, the factor price w and the instrument I under consideration. Since 
                                                 
1  See Diewert (1982) and Nadiri (1982) for the theory of cost and production functions. 
2  Here it is implicitly assumed that there is a quantity  ( ) s.t. , Z XF E Z = .   3
emissions can be modeled either as an input or as an output we obtain six cases in total. It 
will be proved that all these cases can be described by one (abstract) cost function 
() ,, TC w X I . Thus this section presents a simple and unified approach of modeling environ-
mental regulation. 
At first we discuss the price control and then the quantity restrictions.  
a)  Emission tax 
Suppose that emissions E are taxed by the tax t. If E is a factor the tax t represents the price of 
emissions. Therefore the extended cost function can be defined by means of the standard cost 
function  () () ,,: ,,
f TC w X t C t w X =  for I t = . Here the superscript f indicates that emissions 
are a factor.  
If X and E are joint products the extended cost function  ( ) ,,
p TC w X t  (p = product) is the 
solution of the cost minimization problem 
  () () ( ) min , ,
Q CG w X AC w Q t X Q + +− . 
Total costs comprise production and abatement cost and the tax payment. The solution to this 
problem requires that the marginal abatement costs equal the tax:  () , Q AC w Q t =  or 
()
1 , Q QA Cw t
− =  where 
1
Q AC
−  denotes the inverse of  Q AC  with respect to the second argu-
ment. Therefore we obtain 
  ()( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
11 ,, , , , ,
p
QQ T C wXt C G wX A C wA C wt t X A C wt
−− =+ + − . 
The emission tax is, of course, levied on final emissions after abatement and is therefore not 
identical to a commodity tax. 
b)  Absolute standard 
Let the level of emissions be restricted
3 to no more than E. Then final emissions have to be 
equal to E XQ =−, given that the restriction is binding. For I E =  the extended cost 
function can therefore be defined directly by  ( )( ) ,, : ,,
f TC w X E CC w E X =  and 
() ( ) ( ) ,, : , ,
p TC w X E CG w X AC w X E =+ − , respectively, since in the latter case QXE =− 
units of emissions have to be abated. 
c)  Relative standard 
A relative standard
4 α  restricts (net) emissions per unit of the final product X. It is given by 
EX α ≤ . If emissions represent a factor, α  can be any positive number. When the standard 
is binding we can define  () ( ) ,, : , ,
f TC w X CC w X X αα = .  
If emissions represent a joint product the relative standard α  has to be less than unity (since 
g EX ≡ ): it restricts final emissions 
 




== ≤  
                                                 
3  Helfand (1991) discusses various standards in detail. 
4  See also Ebert (1998).   4
and leads to  () 1 QX α =− . 
We then define  ()( ) ( ) ( ) ,, : , , 1
p T C wX C GwX A Cw X αα =+ −  for I α = . 
For relative standards we have to impose the condition that the problem of profit maximi-
zation is well-defined and that the firm does not abate emissions voluntarily. 
Thus in all these cases an extended cost function can be derived from the assumptions made. 
4.  Discussion and application 
Now we discuss the outcome: we obtain an extended cost function  () ,, TC w X I  for 
,,  o r   It E α =  and both types of technology (approaches described above). The properties of 
the cost function can be derived directly and are the usual ones. We obtain:
5 
Result 1 
() ,, TC w X I  satisfies Property C and  0 wX TC >  for  , I tE =  or α . 
Given additional regulatory constraints it is not clear whether Shephard’s Lemma is still valid 
in its usual form. But in the model considered here we get 
Result 2 
The derived demand function for the factor Z is given by  ( ) ,, w TC w X I . 
For the comparative statics analysis performed below the derivatives  , XI wI TC TC , and  I TC  
will play an important role: They describe the reaction of marginal cost, of the derived 
demand for Z, and of total cost to a (marginal) change in the level of the instrument I. In 
order to characterize them (qualitatively) we introduce the term ‘strengthening the instrument 
I’. It means that the abatement and reduction requirement becomes more stringent. 
Strengthening the regulation I marginally can be described by  
  0  for  dI I t >=  and  0  for  dI I E <=  or α . 
Given these definitions we obtain (see also Table I) 
Result 3 
Strengthening the regulation I  
(i)  increases marginal total costs and the derived demand for Z: 
  0, 0 XI wI TC dI TC dI ≥≥  for  ,,    I tE o rα =  
and 
(ii)  increases total costs at a decreasing rate: 
  0 I TC dI >  and 0 II TC dI <  for  , I tE =  or α .  
The implications of tightening the regulation are as expected: marginal costs and the demand 
for the factor Z are increased. If E is a factor, it is substituted by Z. If it is an output, abate-
                                                 
5  The proof of all assertions concerning the extended cost function TC is straightforward and can be found in 
an Appendix available on request from the author.   5
ment and reduction of E raise the demand for Z. Total costs are a concave function of the 
parameter I. Thus costs are increasing in I, but at a decreasing rate. 
Having discussed the properties of an extended cost function we finally consider a firm and 
its reaction to the forms of environmental regulation introduced. The implications for its 
behavior can be easily described for the case in which prices do not change. We establish 
Result 4 
For a price-taking firm strengthening the instrument I decreases the quantity produced, (net) 
emissions and profits. 
The firm has two possibilities to react to the environmental regulation. It can decrease 
production. Then the level of emissions is also reduced automatically. Moreover, it can inten-
sify abatement. When emissions are interpreted as a factor, they can be substituted by the 
factor of production. If the final product and emissions are joint products the firm possesses a 
separate abatement technology and can make more efforts in abating. If it is subject to a 
performance standard it must react in one (or both) of these ways. If it is regulated by a tax, 
the reactions described are in the firm’s own interest. In all these cases output, emissions and 
profits are decreased (see also Table I). 
The proof of this result is simple: Profit maximization yields the first-order condition 
0 X pT C −= . The implicit function theorem then implies  () 0 XI XX dX dI TC TC = −< . 
Furthermore, the marginal change in profits is given by  0 I dp r o f i t T Cd I =− <  since 
() XI
dp r o f i t d X
p TC TC
dI dI
=− − . One similarly obtains 




=+ < . 
5.  Conclusion 
The discussion in section 4 demonstrates the attractiveness and relevance of the concept of an 
extended cost function. It possesses the usual properties of a cost function with respect to the 
factor price and output. Furthermore, it reacts appropriately to changes in the regulatory 
parameter. The qualitative results derived above do not depend on the scenario considered 
(though things can sometimes be made a little bit more precise – see Table I). Therefore, 
using the device of an extended cost function, we are able to confine ourselves to performing 
a single (comparative statics) analysis, the results of which are valid for various scenarios 
(modeling of emissions and kinds of regulation) and can therefore be interpreted in many 
different ways. 
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Table I:  Derivatives of TC and E 
* If the results differ, [ ] ...  contains the result for the case in which emissions  
are modeled as an output. 
 
 
() ,, TC w X I   I=t 
input/output
*  I=E  I=α  
I TC   >0 <0  <0 
wI TC   >0 <0  <0 
XI TC   >0[1] <0  <0 
II TC   <0 >0  >0 
E  = t TC = ( ) , X Qw t − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ =E  = X α  
w E   >0 0  0 
X E   >0[1] 0  α  
I E   <0 1  X 
 
 